INTRODUCTION
In the 1880's the American technique for making iron diverged from the methods used by the British. This paper examines the divergence and seeks to determine whether it signifies economic inefficiency in the production of iron on the part of either country. It is commonly held that the divergence in technology represented a failure on the part of British entrepreneurs which implied a direct welfare loss in the sense that they were operating inside the relevant production possibilities frontier. The divergence was also part of a larger decline in Britain's industrial power over the latter half of the 19th Century.
In this paper it is argued that there was a failure of British entrepreneurs in the iron industry, but this failure was of such a small magnitude in 1890 that correcting it would have provided only a small welfare gain and would not have affected decline.
The failure of the British iron entrepreneurs lay in not adopting the new technique of hard driving which was pioneered by the advanced American producers of pig iron in the 1880's and 1890's. Hard driving is a method of increasing the make (or output) of a furnace by blowing hot air through it at high pressure. Since the furnace make (output) was limited by the availability of air, increasing the air per unit time dramatically increased the furnace make. The way to force more air through a furnace of a given dimension was to increase the air pressure. The Americans drove their furnaces at about 9 pounds per square inch, while the British drove their furnaces at only 5 pounds per square inch.
Hard driving enabled Americans to produce half again as much iron as the British with the same size furnace. l 2.
The accusation that British entrepreneurs did not adopt new methods, particularly in ferrous metal production and chemicals, is a very old accusation.
In the Iron and Steel Institute Journal (ISIJ), there is a long and sometimes acrimonious debate between English and American ironmasters on the subject of "It has been said of our [U. S.] furnaces that 'they lead a short life, but a merry one.' That is literally true, and up to a certain point I regard it as the truest economy. • •• In the Same length of time, with two relinings, the American furnace would have made 450,000 tons or nearly 30% more [than the English furnace] with the same plant, and an additional expense of ten cents per ton on the cost of iron. [After calculating capital costs per ton,] the difference in favor of a 'short and merry life' appears to be $52,500 each blast. "3
The theme that British ironmasters were slow to adopt new technologies was bandied abou t in the popular press of that day and received the support of no less a person than Alfred Marshall writing for the House of Commons. 4 Burn revitalized the failure hypothesis, and it was picked up by the new economic historians in their 1970 conference sponsored by the National Science Founda-tions of the failure debate begun nearly a century ago. 6 These recent contributions are much closer in spirit to the original debaters of 1887 than they are to the intervening economists and historians. The original debaters were concerned entirely with the question of whether neglect of a particular technique-hard driving or the Solvay process--was rational for British entreprenuers.
Many of the interveners concentrated their inquiry on macro-parameters, rates of growth, and the like--parameters that cannot separate the effects of poor 7 management for unfortunate location or adverse market structure.
The important findings of this new wave of economic historians are that (1) the British acted rationally in agriculture by not adopting mechanized equipment--no failure 8 ;
(2) neglect of the Solvay process for producing soda was increasingly costly after the late l880's--failure 9 ; and (3) Britain was actually superior to American in the production of iron in l890--no failure. driving by the addition of blowing engines; but this decision was a lumpy, risky one which--it is hypothesized--did not necessarily respond to market forces.
The way to test this hypothesis of failure is to estimate conditional cost curves, appropriately adjusted for ore richness and type of fuel, that are further conditioned on the degree to which the plant in question was hard driven. If the market were working and entrepreneurs were making the proper decisions with regard to hard driving, then varying hard driving would not change the costs.1 2
5.
Because of the diversity of data, it is easier to get at the cost curves by estimating the resultant factor demands. The next sections estimate the demands for coke, labor, capital, and ore. These demands are then combined to estimate the costs of changing to hard driving. The conclusion is that hard driving costs less than the British method and that the British should have adopted this technique. A very crude estimate of the demand facing British pig iron producers is then used to show that eliminating the entrepreneurial failure would not have changed Britain's market share by very much.
CAPITAL COSTS
The first step in deciding whether hard driving paid is to approximate the capital requirements per ton of output of hard-driven and not-hard-driven plants.
For modern firms, such as those described in ISIJ for 1887, the cost of con- Kingdom, the linings are assumed to cost £1,900, the average of these two estimates.
8.
In England, at an interest rate of 5 percent, 25 years of furnace linings could be bought with an endowment of £1,681 for an English-style plant and £10,320 for an American-style, hard-driven plant. In the United States, at an interest rate of 6 percent, the endowment would have to be $11,365 for the English-style plant and $73,365 for the American-style, hard-driven plant.
Adding the costs of the relining fund and the construction costs gives an estimate of the total capital requirements of the two types of plants in the two countries. These estimates appear in tons of metal are to be produced. Looking at this in a crude per ton perspective, the savings in yearly capital rental are on the order of 5 cents per ton.
Before concluding that hard driving saves capital at both English and American prices, it should be remembered that the result is very sensitive to the amount the make increases when furnaces are harder driven. The assumption used here has been that hard driving increases the make from 30,000 tons to 52,600 tons per year. If hard driving increases the make only to 43,500 tons per year, then hard driving would not be capital saving at either the American or English prices. The historical evidence is not terribly clear on this point. A cautious interpretation of the results would be that hard driving saves some capital costs but probably not as much as the estimated $44,710.
FUEL, LABOR, AND ORE COSTS
Demands for the remaining factors--labor, fuel, and ore--are estimated from the Report. The method is to assume a family of conditional cost curves, each cost curve corresponding to a slightly different technology. Technologies are distinguished by the quality of the iron ore used which is measured by the percent of iron in the ore (pet); the type of fuel on which the plant was built to operate, measured by the ratio of coke to fuel (frat); and how hard the plant was driven which is measured by a ratio of output to plant size (drv). The assumption is that entrepreneurs were not free to vary these technical factors. In the case of ore, location decided the ore type. The percent of coke in the fuel mixture was partially a matter of location and partially furnace design. In any event, neither modern American nor modern British firms used any fuel but coke. It is hypothesized that hard driving was determined by a constraint of entrepreneurship. If the interpretation of failure is true, then moving to harder driven furnaces should decrease the cost of operation.
10.
The explanation given above about the form of the cost function is expanded upon in the Appendix and leads to estimating factor demands with the following variables:
where pct, frat, and drY are defined above and P K , P L , and Pc are the prices of capital, labor, and coke, respectively. L, C, 0, and Q are labor, coke, ore, and the output, pig iron. McCloskey's focus on coke rates only is erroneous because, as this paper shows, the difference in capitalization in the two countries was vast and ,greatly outweighed considerations of the other inputs.
The major quarrel with McCloskey's work is his aggregation. As shown above, British and American plants can be viewed as coming from the same family of technologies. The reason there was both good and bad American practice was that prices were very high in the United States (when compared with the average costs of efficient firms). These high prices kept inefficient firms in production. Average American technique was the average of firms that earned profits and firms that just broke even, and these two sets of producers were worlds apart in technique and efficiency. By and large, the efficient American producers were located around Pittsburgh (where the high-quality coke was located). Earlier, American firms had established themselves in the south and in the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania. These earlier firms were kept in production by the failure of the efficient firms to expand faster than the demand for iron. In England the conditions of trade were much different. Prices were nearly the same as average costs of the efficient firms. The presumptive cost savings were on the order of 5 percent of price.
It would take an elasticity of demand of 10 for the price change attendant on more efficient techniques to make the demand for British iron great enough for the United Kingdom to equal the United States in iron production in the decade 1890 to 1900. Not only would the elasticity of demand have had to be 10 but also all of the preceding, very generous assumptions--including the assumption that all of the gains from efficiency would be passed on as lower prices and that none of them would be captured as rents--would also have had to be true. The answer to the British decline in the iron industry lies elsewhere. Temin argues that Britain did not have access to the German and 27 American markets because of the tariff wall. For steel, of which iron is a large part, Temin pointed out that the tariff wall prohibited the British from supplying the two fastest growing segments of the steel market: America and Germany. Looking at it another way, a U. S. firm would recover its entire construction costs in one year. An English firm would take three years to recover its construction cost. The incentive for hard driving would not just be the cost savings--it would also be the profits on the expanded makes. The present value of these profits over a 25-year period would be $2,800,000 (United States) and £220,000 (United Kingdom). Thus, the incentive to try the new techniques was much greater for the Americans than it was for the British.
What do these enormous profits mean? Economic theory suggests that the rigors of competition and the free entry for firms will drive economic profits to zero. Moreover, inefficient firms--those with high costs--will be driven from the market. First, examine the English market. The spread in costs is immense. There was a difference of $3.00 or 20 percent of cost between the least-and most-efficient firm. Profits were 25 percent of costs. Both pieces of evidence argue that U. S. industry was not in long-run equilibrium. How could this come about? One argument would be that there were barriers to entry. The price of $250,000 per furnace undoubtedly made entry somewhat difficult. Not everyone could raise that much money in 1890, especially for a risky venture. Another argument would be that the high prices of iron (and profits) were not anticipated in America. This is plausible.
The dawning of the steel age was in 1870, and iron and its products were used in an increasing number of applications. In the United States, production of iron increased fivefold between 1870 (1,665 K tons) and 1890 (9,203 K tons); it tripled again between 1890 and 1910 (27,304 K tons) . Offhand, one cannot tell how much of this increase was from decreased price and how much was from increased demand (new uses). Yet, the sheer size of the increase makes it believable that people did not anticipate the demand, prices, and profits of making iron. The~arket in the United Kingdom also saw an increase in the quantity of iron products, but the production growth was more sedate. Pig iron output increased by a factor of 1.5 from 1870 (5,963 K tons) to 1890 32 (7,904 K tons) and by 1.5 again from 1890 to 1910 (10,012 K tons).
It is easier to believe that English entrepreneurs foresaw the increases in the United Kingdom than it is to believe that the American entrepreneurs foresaw the increase in the U. S. demand. To sum this up, whenever entrepreneurs anticipate positive profits, they will build more furnaces, increase supply, and drive the profit rate back toward zero. If the profits (prices and demands)
19.
are not properly anticipated, then and only then can profits actually appear.
The major difference between the United States and the United Kingdom may well have been the stability of demand and, therefore, the ability of entrepreneurs to predict prices and profits.
CONCLUSIONS
1< Hard driving saved labor, coke, and capital. The cost curves of hard-driven firms were just barely inside those of the British-style firms at all relevant prices.
2. Because the cost curves of hard-driven firms are inside those of British-style firms, the production function of hard-driven firms was above that of British-style firms at all relevant factor intensities (Shephard's duality theorem for cost curves and production functions). British-style firms were mildly inefficient.
3. The inefficiency of British firws amounts to £.10 per ton or 5.0 percent of the market price. It is hard to see how this could have influenced the share of the world market held by the United Kingdom firms to any great degree. It is hard to see how the "entrepreneurial failure" had much to do with Britain's supposed decline.
Market conditions varied greatly between the United States and the
United Kingdom. The spread between price and average cost was much greater in the United States. It is postulated that this spread resulted from the unanticipated nature of increased American demand for iron.
5. The major incentive to hard driving was the profits on the increased make. Because the profits per ton in the United States were much larger than those in the United Kingdom, the incentive for hard driving in the United States was much larger than the incentive in the United Kingdom. In this case z will be a semicontrollable variable--hard driving. In most comparisons, z would be a country or other uncontrollable variables. The difference is not trivial.
23.
A profit-maximizing entrepreneur would choose z to minimize C. He would choose either the lowest or the greatest possible z or one for which the derivative of C with respect to z is zero. First,consider a solution with dC/dz = 0, i.e., an interior solution. This solution gives z as a function of prices and output, z = Z (Pl." P n , Q). Substituting this back into the cost function will give a cost function of the usual type--one .with only prices and quantity. P n A (Z)' n By its construction, this function will have the special property, dC/dz = O.
In other words,z would be a jointly determined variable and would vanish from the cost function.
The second case to consider is the case where dC/dz < 0 (resp. > 0), and a constraint z~b (resp. z = 0) is binding. In case 2 it is assumed that entrepreneurs exhibit cost-minimizing behavior with respect to all variables except hard driving. Furnaces are driven at the pressures customary at the time they were erected; fear of burning furnace linings stops the entrepreneurs from changing the plant to be harder driven.
Combining the two cases, the entrepreneurs can be described as follows. Both z and C would then be endogenous variables.
24.
The object of this exercise is to estimate the parameters of C and A.
If there were observations (or any information) on b, one could apply simultaneous equation techniques to estimate the parameters. But in at least some cases, b represents a stupidity constraint and is unmeasurable. This is unfortunate. It means that the only way to estimate the functions consistently is to know whether z = b, but the only way to know if z = b is to estimate the functions.
There are two things left to do. Assume z is less than band estimate, and asstwe z = b and estimate. The first procedure (assuming z is less than b and estimating) will yield no new information. Apart from a disturbance term, 3c/3z = 0 for the estimated cost function. This is by the con- the year There are data on variable inputs for a cross-section of firms for 33 1889.
These data do not contain capital costs, but two extraordinary accounts of the cost of building a blast furnace plant do provide some information on the cost of capital. The way to combine these two sources is to estimate conditional factor demands. Because the data on capital are so sparse, the results will give only a rough idea of the effect of hard driving on capital requirements; but this is the best one can do.
25.
Let the cost function be of the form proposed by Diewert. 34 n n C = Q' 1: The additional assumption is made that relative factor prices did not influence the conditional factor demand for ore. every j # ore. This assumption is plausible (and This means d J. = 0 for ore was made by McCloskey). It means that other factors of production could not be substituted for ore. (The assumption is especially convenient because it is hard to view the price of ore as predetermined.)
A vector z will be the variables hard driving (drv), ratio of coal to coke (frat), and percent of iron in the ore (pet). For an explanation of why the fuel ratio was important, see Temin's Appendix B.
35 The percent of iron in ore was primarily determined by a firm's location. It influenced all the variables because it made ore less bulky for a given iron content. This cut handling and shipping costs and lessened the amount of coke needed to reduce the ore. The presence of hard driving has already been explained.
From physical arguments, air pressure should have been proportional to output per day (diameter of bosh)**2 • height of stack •
26.
This variable was used to represent hard driving (drv). It captures the idea of a large make from a small furnace. (Letting drv = output per day per diameter of bosh makes little difference to the results.)
The data are taken from the Report; they are a cross-section study of 118 furnaces, about 15 percent of those cited in the next census. The price of capital is presented earlier in this paper. Ninety-seven of the points were used--90 in the United States and 7 in England. Furnaces were excluded either because they burned charcoal or because data about them were missing. An additional problem was encountered with data for wage rates. There were only data on 17 firms. For these 17 firms, the wage rate was regressed on a d~~y for region and the percent of iron in the ore used by the furnaces. The use of estimated wage rates introduces an error in the variables problem. The coefficients are biased downward. The assumption is that wages were determined by location, and ore content is an indicator of location. The coefficients of this regression were then used to predict the wage rates at all the other firms in the sample. Furnaces often burned more than one fuel. Fuels were aggregated by the formula: fuel = coke + .75 anthracite + .63 bituminous--all in tons. This aggregation, suggested by McCloskey, is based on the carbon content of one ton of each of the fuels. 36
All discussions (and statistical tests but not estimation) are done for a hypothetical firm that approximates the dimensions and conditions of efficient firms in the 1890 Report. Both hard-driven and British-style firms were assumed to have furnaces 240 inches across the bosh, with 75-foot stacks. They burned no anthracite. The hard-driven furnace was assumed to make 52,690 tons per year from ore, with an iron content of 60 percent. The British-style furnace was assumed to make 30,000 tons per year from ore, with 50 percent content of iron. Prices in America were taken as $1.50 per man day for labor and 27. $3.00 per ton for coke. In the United Kingdom they were £.12 per man day for labor and £.41 per ton for coke.
By Shephard's lemma, the factor demand for a factor is the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to its own price.
For purely technical reasons (mostly multicollinearity), the richest specifications for the Ai that could be estimated were A striking feature of these regression equations is the relatively large standard errors attached to the parameters. This apparent lack of confidence is illusory since the interest in the equations does not attach to individual coefficients which account for mixed effects--e.g., the effect of prices and hard driving working together--but to the pure effects of hard driving, factor prices, etc. These tests are realized as t tests of appropriate sums of parameters and are described below.
The following tests were performed. First, the hypothesis that the 1900 : Ibid., 1901 (June, 1902 ), pp. 61-63. 1910 : Ibid., 1911 (October, 1912 , p. 56 (Part II). w en
